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Human rights, the law, cyber-security and democracy: after the European Convention  
Judith Bessant*  
Many commentators have treated the internet as a site of democratic freedom and as a new 
kind of public sphere. While there are good reasons for optimism, like any social space 
digital space also has its dark side. Citizens and governments alike have expressed anxiety 
about cyber-crime and cyber-security. In August 2011, the Australian government 
introduced legislation to give effect to Australia becoming a signatory to the European 
Convention on Cybercrime (2001), and at the time of writing, that legislation is still before 
the Parliament.  
In this article, attention is given to how the legal and policy-making process enabling 
Australia to be compliant with the European Convention on Cybercrime 2001 came about. 
Among the motivations that informed both the development of the Convention in Europe 
and then the Australian exercise of legislating for compliance with that Convention was a 
range of legitimate concerns about the impact that cybercrime can have on individuals and 
communities. This article makes the case that equal attention also needs to be given to 
ensuring that legislators and policy-makers differentiate between legitimate security 
imperatives and any over-reach evident in the implementation of this legislation which 
affects rule of law principles, our capacity to engage in democractic practices, and our civic 
and human rights.  
  
Introduction 
Wendy Brown recently pointed to the paradox involved in the coincidence of neo-liberal 
talk of freedom, the promotion of free markets, free trade agreements and globalisation 
since the 1980s, and the urgency and speed with which modern nation states are building 
massive walls along their borders (Brown 2010). While the ‘West’ treated the dismantling of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 as the beginning of a new era of freedom and liberalisation, we now 
see new walls being ‘built as prophylaxes against mobile labour, disease, terror, and the 
innumerable other forces real and unreal that threaten to puncture and undermine the myth 
of the sovereign state’ (Pitcher 2011).  
A similar tension is even more apparent in the increasing preoccupation on the part of 
governments with cyber-security and cybercrime at a time when digital technology is 
rapidly extending its reach and commentators laud the internet as a site of democratic 
freedom (for example, Poster 1997; Rheingold 2000; Coleman and Gotze 2001; Rassmussen 
2008).  
Cyber-security and cybercrime have become central features in a new ‘law and order’ 
discourse that is promoting major policy and political change. This discourse took off 
following the ‘9/11’ attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington on 11 September 2001. As we know, those attacks provoked a raft of anti-
terrorist laws in many countries and an intensification of security and surveillance measures 
as responses to a ‘war on terror’. 
One effect of this has been increasing government surveillance of the internet. A decade 
after 9/11, the US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, speaks of the ‘cyber menace’ in terms 
that conjure up the surprise military attack on America’s Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour in 
1941. ‘The next Pearl Harbour’ we confront, Panetta warns, ‘could very well be a cyber 
attack that cripples our national power systems, our grid security, finance and government 
systems’ (Crimaldi 2011). Indeed, Panetta went on to say:  
Cyberspace is the battlefield of the future. We are all going to have to work very hard not only to defend 
against cyber attacks, but to be aggressive with regards to cyber attacks as well. [Cited in Gienger 2011.] 
Not surprisingly, cyber-security has become a critical component of the defence strategies of 
many nations: cyber warfare is now referred to in the ANZUS treaty, and cyber security has 
become an important consideration in the military posturing enacted between, for example, 
China, North Korea, Russia and the United States. 
The dynamic evolution and growth of the internet itself have played a critical role in 
promoting talk about an ‘explosion’ of cybercrime. It appears that government departments, 
defence agencies, corporations — such as Lockheed, the Bank of America, MasterCard, 
Sony and Google — and, of course, individuals are all prospective victims of cybercrime. 
According to Australia’s former federal Attorney-General, Robert McClelland (2011), ‘Cyber 
crime is a huge and growing problem’ that is ‘now more lucrative than the international 
drug trade’. He argued that because: 
… every Australian home has a computer connected to the web … and more Australian families, 
businesses and government agencies conducting all manner of activities online every year, there are 
more opportunities for cyber criminals to steal money, identities and information from unsuspecting 
victims. [McClelland 2011.]  
Cyber-security and cybercrime provide a new agenda for policy makers, the legal system 
and law enforcement. They also provide a challenge to those engaged in public scholarship 
that requires consideration of such novelties.  
I am also mindful that this takes place in a context characterised by increasing powers of 
state and corporate interests to determine their capacity for access to information and the 
surveillance of citizenry. In 2007, for example, the Australian Labor government announced 
plans to introduce a mandatory internet filter scheme — a proposal that, if adopted, would 
make us bedfellows of regimes such as those of Iran and China (Vaile and Watt 2009). At 
the least, that proposal (which has been laid ‘on the table’ until 2013) attracted considerable 
local and international commentary and criticism from the public. The same could not be 
said in August 2011, when the Australian government introduced legislation to give effect 
to Australia becoming a signatory to the European Convention on Cybercrime (2001). At the 
time of writing, the legislation had been read for a second time in the Senate (in August 
2011) and then adjourned with no further debate. It is listed — as Notice Paper 18 — for this 
winter’s sitting. However, as of 27 June 2012 and with just one sitting week to go, it is not 
clear whether the Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth) will actually be 
passed in the immediate future or again deferred to a later date. 
The fact that this legislation has been represented as a relatively minor and procedural 
action may explain, in part, why it has so far generated relatively little public discussion. 
Yet if, as I propose to do here, we pay attention to this Convention and Australia’s role in it, 
it becomes apparent that there are a number of important matters to consider.  
In this article, I consider how the legal and policy-making process that involves Australia 
becoming compliant with the European Convention on Cybercrime 2001 has been shaped. 
In doing so, I come not as a lawyer or legal scholar, but as someone with an interest in 
policy making. I appreciate the need to prevent social harms that may be facilitated through 
digital technology. There can be little doubt that, among the motivations that informed both 
the development of the Convention in Europe and then the Australian exercise of legislating 
for compliance with that Convention, there was a range of legitimate concerns about the 
serious impact that cybercrime can have on individuals and whole communities. As former 
Attorney-General McClelland noted in the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislation, the 
Australian government was concerned with strengthening the capacity to protect 
Australians from crimes:  
… committed either against or via computer networks, dealing particularly with online fraud, offences 
related to child pornography and unauthorised access, use or modification of data stored on computers. 
[Explanatory Memorandum to the Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Bill, 1.]  
There is no point disagreeing with what McClelland argued in August 2011: 
With Australian families, businesses and governments conducting more and more activities online, 
cybercrime has already overtaken the drug trade as the most profitable form of crime in the world, and 
addressing this requires a consistent international framework that deals with the global nature of 
cybercrime by supporting cooperation between jurisdictions. [House of Representatives 2011, 9153.] 
This imperative to protect citizens and states from cybercrime in its various manifestations 
doubtlessly informs the desire to encourage countries that have proved to be sites of harm 
to other countries to criminalise particular offences that were otherwise difficult, if not 
impossible, to act on. I do not have the space in this article to detail this rationale or to 
assess its credibility in full detail. My point here is that, in fulfilling their obligation to 
protect people from the harms of cybercrime, legislators and policy makers must 
differentiate between legitimate security imperatives and any ‘over-reach’ evident in the 
implementation of this legislation. We need always to ensure that there is a balance between 
achieving security and safeguarding the conditions for a healthy democracy.  
Australians, and citizens of other states, have cause for concern about what is required for 
Australia to be compliant with the Convention. I argue here that we confront one more 
moment when the promise and value of the World Wide Web is being compromised and 
the conditions necessary for a vibrant democratic society are being put at risk by a 
significant degree of over-reach in the design of the Australian legislation. It is worth 
observing that other countries, such as the United States and Italy, have declined to 
implement every aspect of the Convention — moves that compare unfavourably with the 
Australian government’s keenness to sign up to everything required of it. Italy, which was a 
key player in shaping the 2001 Convention, adopted a more balanced approach to 
implementation issues and exercised its option to comply with only the bare minimum 
required of it. The United States likewise declined the requirement to remove the test of 
establishing mens rea from some crimes, and in this way upheld an essential aspect of the 
rule of law that the Australian government was happy to sign away. Such comparisons 
raise a question: Why did the Australian government not examine these aspects more 
closely? 
In this respect, we should note the failure of Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee 
inquiring into the legislation to recommend any substantial changes, even while its 
members agreed that many of the concerns and criticisms expressed were valid. This 
represents a serious failure of the democratic process. It highlights a major ethical problem 
in our current democratic processes as self-interest and parochial (party) interest were given 
priority over the public interest. What we saw were politicians from both sides giving the 
appearance of listening and agreeing with the observations of commentators and critics of 
the legislation, but without conviction or real understanding or recognition of what was at 
stake. It seems that the members of this committee ended up simply toeing their respective 
party lines. If the MPs concerned declined to recommend the kind of changes required of 
them by critics of the legislation, they should at least have made public their principled 
objections to those criticisms. 
In this way, we see yet another paradox operating. The design and development of what 
became the internet from the late 1960s to the 1990s was informed by the principle of 
internet neutrality (Froomkin 2003; Lessig 2006). It is a principle that requires that all 
information be treated equally: that internet service providers and governments ought to 
guarantee, as far as they can, that users are unencumbered by restrictions affecting content, 
sites, speed of data transmission, platforms or types of equipment.  
There are other substantial issues: the handing over of data and functions such as 
intelligence gathering and investigations to other states constitutes an outsourcing of 
sovereignty similar to the ways states have ‘outsourced their sovereignty’ by contracting 
out key functions such as policing to private agents (Verkuil 2007; Thorburn 2010).  
All this has serious implications for the quality of our democratic culture (Verkuil 2007). At 
a time when the sovereignty of states is ostensibly being strengthened by increased 
surveillance, we see one more paradox no less incongruous than the way governments are 
building walls along their borders even as they talk up the virtues of removing 
jurisdictional barriers and promoting a ‘borderless’ globalised world.  
I begin by describing the European Convention on Cybercrime and the decision taken by 
Australia to sign up to it. 
 
What is happening  
The European Convention on Cybercrime is the ‘first international treaty on cyber-crimes’ 
committed ‘via the Internet and other computer networks’. The Convention provides a 
framework to deal with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child 
pornography and what are called ‘violations of network security’ (Joint Select Committee 
on Cybersafety 2011, 1).  
The Convention was the result of work that began in 1997, when a European Committee of 
Experts on Crime in Cyberspace (CECC) was established and assigned the task of drafting a 
legally binding instrument that would address the problem of cyber offences. In 2001, the 
Council of Europe adopted a legally binding treaty instrument known as the Convention on 
Cybercrime. Its ostensible aim was to create a common legal and policy framework that 
eliminated ‘jurisdictional hurdles’ and fostered international cooperation directed towards 
securing global protection against cybercrime. To achieve this, it was argued that new 
measures were needed to assist criminal investigations related to computer systems and to 
facilitate the collection of electronic evidence across borders.  
Australia was invited in September 2010 to accede to the treaty. For this to take place, 
Australia has been required to ensure that amendments are made to existing legislation to 
provide full compliance with the Convention. This will change the ways that Australian law 
enforcement agencies go about detecting and investigating crime. For Australia, this has 
entailed a process of legislative amendment. Among other things, the compliance project 
will involve:  
• transposing into the domestic legal system laws guaranteeing that particular activities 
are criminalised while preserving existing laws;  
• changes to practices of domestic law-enforcement agencies; 
• changes to legal requirements for internet service providers (ISPs); and 
• new processes to ensure foreign law enforcement and mutual assistance. 
Through 2011, the Australian government set about fast-tracking legislation to change the 
way Australian law enforcement agencies go about the business of detecting and 
investigating crime. The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Bill, which was introduced 
into the Australian parliament in June 2011, will amend various statutes, including the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth), the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), and the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth).  
The changes raise a number of significant issues related, on the one hand, to criminal 
sanctions and, on the other hand, to the protection of freedom of speech and deliberation — 
practices integral to any democratic society. In what follows, I consider how certain 
provisions in the Convention and/or the Australian legislation can impact on our 
democratic culture. This is relevant to the provisions made affecting ISP providers, 
infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, and child pornography — provisions 
that potentially have implications for privacy and the security of personal information. In 
part, this is because these provisions are cast very wide. The provisions regarding 
copyright, for example, fail to respect the asserted rights of copyright owners. The provision 
in respect of child pornography is also deserving of further consideration, primarily because 
it is an offence in which children and young people tend to engage. For this reason, care 
needs to be taken to ensure that legislation is drafted and implemented in ways that do not 
have unintended consequences resulting from imposing criminal penalties on children or 
young people. This is of particular concern given that children and young people do not 
currently enjoy any protection of their fundamental rights. 
In what follows, I identify six significant effects of the Convention and the Australian 
legislation: 
• enhanced surveillance producing what can be called a virtual panopticon;  
• the transfer of sovereignty and extended surveillance capacity of domestic and foreign 
law enforcement agencies; 
• civil liberties — privacy and democratic practices;  
• new crimes and criminalising more people and activities; 
• accountability; and 
• effectiveness. 
I discuss these effects in turn and consider how each is likely to affect the rights of 
Australians to privacy or to engage in a range of democratic practices.  
 
Virtual panopticon and surveillance power  
With a view to preventing cybercrime and other ‘unwelcome activities’, member states (that 
is, those that have ratified the Convention) can access and retain personal information on 
citizens in the jurisdictions of other member states. This includes locating and identifying 
sources of communications, their destination, and the date and time of transmission. It also 
includes details of the content, the type of communication, and the devices used — 
including the location of mobile equipment — all without the knowledge of the person of 
interest. 
Compliance with the Convention requires changes first to certain legal obligations on ISPs. 
Under the new legislation, ‘competent authorities’ (ISPs) are legally bound to intercept, 
collect, store, ‘expeditiously preserve’, and produce the data of subscribers when requested 
by local domestic agents and law enforcement agents. The Australian Federal Police can 
also request this material on behalf of a foreign country. ISPs are required to keep 
confidential the content of the data and the fact of the execution of powers relating to the 
collection of information or summonses for data.  
Second, the legislation changes the role of the ISP from being a contractual agent and 
common carrier for the customer, to being the agent of litigants and an arm of law 
enforcement. This means that the ISP will change from being a service provider to being a 
police informant and possibly an enforcer. This is a profound change. It is an intervention 
that directly threatens the rule of law, because wrongdoings need only be asserted as a 
prelude to intervention, rather than needing to be proved in a court of law. This threatens 
individuals, who are operated on remotely and abstractly rather than directly through the 
police or private litigants declaring a criminal offence. 
Third, the changes affect the ways interceptions and access to data can take place. 
Currently, prescribed Australian agencies can apply for a warrant to covertly access stored 
communications (such as email records) to assist in their investigation of domestic offences. 
There is currently no mechanism to enable a stored communication warrant to be obtained 
to assist a foreign investigation without a case for doing so being put to a magistrate. The 
‘problem’ with this arrangement, we are told, is that: 
… this mechanism can be time-consuming and is limited to information which has already been 
obtained in the course of an Australian investigation. [Explanatory Memorandum to the Cybercrime 
Legislation Amendment Bill, 19.]  
The new arrangement requires Australia to respond to a foreign country’s request for access to 
stored communications for foreign law enforcement purposes by enabling the Attorney-
General to authorise the Australian Federal Police or state police to apply for a stored 
communication warrant.  
Foreign countries will be able to serve notice requiring the ‘responsible domestic agents’ to 
hand over information to foreign law enforcement agents. According to the Convention, 
member states must comply with requests to search, seize and disclose computer data 
located in its territory (Art 31(1)(2)), and are ‘obligated’ to ‘afford one another mutual 
assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences 
related to computer systems and data, and for the collection of evidence in electronic form’ 
that relates to a criminal offence (Art 25(3)). All parties must assist and cooperate with each 
other to the widest extent possible in investigating and combating cybercrime, and that 
cooperation will be facilitated: 
… through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in 
criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic 
laws. [Art 23.]  
While the Convention requires signatory states to cooperate with other member states, thus 
mandating mutual assistance across jurisdictions, the Australian legislation goes further, 
stipulating cooperation with ‘other countries’ — not just signatories. In this way, Australia will 
be required to cooperate with any country that requests preservation and disclosures under 
the new arrangements, even if it is not a signatory to the Convention (for example, the 
United States). This in effect discharges Australia’s sovereignty to any number of countries, 
with the prospect of providing information to regressive states. 
In short, the Convention provides law enforcement agencies with unilateral ‘right of way’ 
access across borders so that they can access material in each other’s jurisdictions. In this 
way, the law enforcement agencies of one country can access computer data in another 
country without the consent or knowledge of those being put under surveillance (Art 32). 
All-encompassing surveillance of the kind just outlined produces what Foucault (1977, 194-
228) referred to as the ‘panopticon effect’. The panopticon effect specifies the ways that 
citizens are exposed to constant surveillance through subtle and often invisible mechanisms. 
Foucault (1977, 104) pointed to the effects of this regime of surveillance when he observed:  
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints 
of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. 
Knowing that ISPs are collecting and storing data on our every communication reminds us 
that we are always being watched. This may have a powerful and effective inhibitory or 
self-regulating effect on us all. Indeed, instilling into a population the knowledge that we 
are observed throughout our daily lives is a disciplinary technique in itself — a coercive 
power that results in self-monitoring.  
Here is one initiative that erodes the conditions needed for a strong liberal democracy that 
relies on the relatively free exchange of information and the capacity to speak without fear 
or favour. Those who value deliberative practice, free speech, and a vibrant public sphere in 
which citizens are free to debate and deliberate without fear or favour will be the losers. The 
new arrangements will have a serious impact on citizens wanting to access and exchange 
information, to communicate and to deliberate. It will not impact exclusively on ‘criminals’. 
As Colin Jacobs, Chair of Electronic Frontier, argued:  
At some point data retention laws can be reasonable, but highly-personal information such as browsing 
history is a step too far … You can’t treat everyone like a criminal. That would be like tapping people’s 
phones before they are suspected of doing any crime. [Cited in Grubb 2010.] 
In her original meditations on the nature and value of the political life, Hannah Arendt 
distinguished sharply between the private and the public spaces. In 1951, in her initial 
consideration of the nature of totalitarianism, she drew attention to the way the state 
invaded all aspects of a person’s life, thereby obliterating both the point of a public political 
life and the value of a private life. Later (Arendt 1958), she defended the value of an open 
public sphere in which the value of freedom was that it was subordinate to nothing else. 
Open societies both value and afford privacy to their citizens while promoting openness, 
access to information, and freedom of speech and opinion formation in the public sphere. 
Repressive regimes, on the other hand, require secrecy and privacy about their own 
activities, while at the same time refusing the right of individuals to privacy or to access 
personal information or communications. The new cybercrime laws in the context of 
debates over the war on terror have led to the suspension of normal civil rights. This later 
discourse seems to have morphed into the realm of non-terror-related cybercrime offences. 
Knowing that we are under surveillance and that the retained data can be made available to 
both criminal and civil law enforcement, to intelligence agencies, and to private litigants (as 
part of pre-litigation discovery) after they show reasonable cause will undoubtedly 
constrain what many people do in terms of the information they access and exchange and 
their willingness to speak freely. It will have a serious negative impact on our sense of 
freedom, our sense of safety, and our well-being. It will diminish our ability to do well in 
our homes, at work, or simply when moving around in both real and virtual public space 
without the fear that comes when we know we are being watched.  
A parallel effect is likely, given that the concept of ‘cybercrime’ is not defined — thereby 
constituting a conveniently nebulous enemy.  
The capacity for surveillance has been extended enormously, not only because of the ways 
the existing network of digital technology is constantly ramifying, but also because of the 
way that the problem of ‘cybercrime’ has been defined in the legislation and in the 
Convention. We might assume that ‘cybercrime’ refers to crimes such as child pornography, 
forgery, illegal access to computer systems (hacking), or infringements of copyright and so 
forth. The fact that these matters are already clearly addressed in the statute books might 
indicate that adding a new category of ‘cybercrime’ is in some respects redundant or 
superfluous. That suspicion is perhaps confirmed, given that there is no clarity about what 
additional matters or what kinds of conduct are to be designated as ‘cyber-crime’. Does it, 
for example, include cyber-attacks that constitute acts of war, or intelligence gathering by 
government or military espionage, or breeches of information security? It appears not to, 
even though these activities pose a serious threat to national and world safety.  
Absent a clear account of the problem or crime that the law aims to remedy, there is no 
clarity about who the criminal or enemy is. As a result, the cybercriminal becomes a 
conveniently nebulous character well able to take a place among the other dark figures of 
crime. Details on who ‘they’ are, their interests and their activities are in short supply. 
Identities are conflated and distinctions between the various ‘suspects’ are lost, creating the 
impression that there is one amorphous criminal-cum-enemy who, like Sherlock Holmes’s 
arch enemy Professor Moriarty, is now everywhere. As writers such as Crimaldi (2011) and 
Goss (2011) have suggested, they presumably include ‘Run-of-the-mill hackers’, ‘criminal 
gang members’, paedophiles, political activists (such as Anonymous and LulzSec), state-
sponsored cyber-spooks, and those involved in commercial espionage, who are morphed 
into one kind of virtual criminal.  
All this takes place in the context of a great expansion of the scope of cybercrimes specified 
in offences over the last 15 years. It’s a development that points to the high risk of ‘scope 
creep’ as more stringent provisions criminalise an ever-greater range of marginal activities. 
There are obvious political advantages in relying on fuzzy definitions and accounts of the 
criminal–enemy as an amorphous threat. This is a powerful rhetorical technique that creates 
maximum flexibility for law enforcement agents by allowing descriptions of the enemy and 
the crime to change according to requirements and without the constraints and safeguards 
that a sharp definition of the crime provides. 
A fuzzy definition also works to engender a fear and to mobilise a coalition of support, 
helping to facilitate the expansion of surveillance and the extension of state power. 
Morphing the enemy also allows the enemy to constantly change from the ‘enemy within’, 
to the child pornographer, to the serious foreign threat. In this way, the enemy is 
everywhere, just waiting to strike at any unexpected moment.  
 
Transfer of sovereignty 
A second, more interesting, effect of embedding the Convention into domestic legislation is 
the way the Australian government will effectively transfer some part of its sovereignty to a 
foreign interest — namely, the consortia of nation-states constituted by the Convention. It is 
important to point out that while the United States ratified the Convention, it did not 
become a signatory and is therefore not bound to the requirements set out in the 
Convention. The United States declined to sign because the compliance requirements were 
said to contravene certain civil rights set out in the US constitution and because there were 
concerns about relinquishing sovereignty to a foreign interest. 
Under the mutual assistance provisions, warrants for ‘communication interception’ and 
‘stored communication’ warrants, and so on, will be required — without sufficient clarity 
about the issue of dual criminality or sufficient information about the effect on matters such 
as civil rights to privacy. Australia will be required to provide to foreign countries with 
scant information about the offences being investigated. This means that the laws, rules and 
requirements of that entity supersede the sovereignty implied by the Australian 
Constitution. On the question of sovereignty, the Australian Privacy Foundation stated: 
It is fundamental to national sovereignty that a person’s behaviour must not be subject to the powers of 
Australian national security and law enforcement agencies unless that behaviour is criminal in this 
country. 
Powers must not be granted in respect of behaviour that would not be a crime if performed in Australia. 
An Australian citizen must be protected against abuse of their communications, their data, their 
freedom within Australia, and their freedom against extradition actions. [Australian Privacy 
Foundation 2011, 11.] 
Further, as Civil Liberty Australia points out, Australia and its parliament has had no 
formal input into the current or future terms of the network of nation-states created by the 
European Convention (Rowling 2011).  
There are many issues raised by this effect on sovereignty. One has to do with dual 
criminality. The issue of ‘dual criminality’ is unclear in the current legislation. Australia 
seems to be caught in a position where ISPs can be required to provide evidence against a 
person for activities in which the person is engaged in Australia but which are not criminal 
offences in Australia — such as political dissent or other ‘offences’ that may relate to a 
person’s sexuality, religion, ethnicity or political persuasion) (Cybercrime Legislation 
Amendment Bill, 5EA). There is no exemption written into the amendment legislation to the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act that omits political offences (dissidents) or that 
exempts status offences such as those just mentioned.  
The Australian government is going further than required for compliance with the 
Convention, which does actually provide an exemption for political offences. According to 
the Convention, a member state can reject a request if there are grounds to believe that the 
offence is ‘a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence’, or when ‘the 
requested Party considers that execution of the request will place its sovereignty, security, 
order public or other essential interests’ at risk (Art 29(5)). This important caveat is omitted 
from the Australian legislation.  
In this way, the Australian government is handing over responsibility that is ours, while 
transferring the power to hold the Australian government and parliament to account. In 
short, our capacity to determine what is right and wrong, to determine what is in our 
national interest, and to protect both our interests and our citizens is being compromised. 
Giving authority to the European Convention and to foreign countries — for example, to 
determine what political and other activities are criminal when carried out in an Australian 
jurisdiction — is surely a reckless act.  
This arrangement also means that Australia will almost certainly be a party to surveillance 
and the investigation of people involved in civil disobedience and other dissident activities 
on behalf of a repressive government, with the prospect that the person in question will face 
severe penalties — up to and including the death sentence.  
These observations segue into a consideration of the effect of the Convention and the 
domestic legislative amendments on human rights.  
 
Privacy and democratic practice: the issue of civil liberties  
When read against the European socio-political context, the European Convention may well 
be seen as an instrument that is less threatening to human rights than it is in Australia. This 
is so if only because citizens of European nations have access to quite effective and 
actionable protections for human rights that are missing in Australia. 
There are a number of basic concerns. These are framed by the fact that Australia is a 
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR is, like the 
European Convention, an international treaty. The UDHR stipulates (in Art 12) that: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family home, or correspondence, 
nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.  
This right is put at risk in Australia by the scale and scope of the changes to legislation.  
First, the Convention increases the power of law enforcement agencies, and enables 
unprecedented access to private information at both a domestic and an international level. 
The promise of security and what the sociologist Furedi (1997) calls the ‘celebration of 
safety’ surely sound attractive, even commendable — especially after hearing warnings 
from the current Attorney-General that:  
Cybercrime is a growing threat to individuals, businesses and governments around the world and has 
already overtaken the drug trade as the most profitable form of all crimes. [McClelland 2011.] 
McClelland added that:  
The global nature of cybercrime means no nation alone can effectively combat it. International co-
operation and engagement are essential to an effective response. Keeping ahead of the game is the key 
to reducing the risk. [McClelland 2011.] 
Yet not only does the new legislation enable unprecedented access to private information at 
both a domestic and an international level, it also sets in place confidentiality requirements 
regarding interception warrants that make it an offence to reveal information about 
authorisations. While some concealment of what is going on is needed to investigate crime, 
wholesale confidentiality provisions are unnecessary and contrary to conditions that 
contribute to a healthy democracy.  
What possible rationale could be offered to require indefinite secrecy about who accessed a 
person’s telecommunications data by law enforcement agents, once the perceived threat has 
passed? Citizens who are subject to an investigation and who have had their private 
communications intercepted ought to be informed that they are under investigation, or at 
least to be able to access that information through a freedom of information application.  
These concerns are not addressed by assurances that the privacy of citizens is safeguarded 
by the requirement that the authorised officer needs to ensure they are satisfied that the 
disclosures are ‘reasonably necessary ‘for the enforcement of the criminal law of another 
country. What is proposed is that when a warrant is sought by a foreign agent, the value of 
the information sought by the warrant will only be assessed by the issuing authority based 
on the extent they are provided with information from the requesting country that allows 
for that evaluation  (Law Council of Australia 2011, 5). Missing, however, are any 
safeguards — for example, a guiding principle or explicit check that can help the officer in 
determining whether ‘interference’ with the individual’s privacy is warranted and the 
degree of privacy interference that is tolerable.  
Under the new arrangement, law enforcement agencies will be provided with access to 
sensitive information on the ‘mere suspicion it might be useful to an investigation’. 
Missing also is clarity about what can and cannot be intercepted. Is everything (family 
photographs, telephone conversations, emails, Facebook notices, downloads) up for grabs? 
Are our health records, genetic or psychological test results, and finance records to be made 
available? And what spaces (private space at home, kindergartens, schools, work) are under 
surveillance? It’s worth noting that, currently, if a citizen’s health and financial records are 
subpoenaed, the individual affected is given notice (Australian Privacy Foundation 2011).  
Finally, there is the related problem of the secondary use of data. Currently, there are no 
limits on the secondary uses of this data by foreign agencies. 
Precise threshold tests are needed. If, under the mutual assistance requirement, clandestine 
and invasive powers are to be used to investigate foreign offences, then we need clearly 
prescribed minimum requirements. To safeguard civil liberties, the officers authorising the 
disclosures need to be able to demonstrate that clearly stated conditions are met. As it 
stands, there are no guidelines for making such determinations. If a foreign country wants 
to extend its reach and exercise invasive police powers in Australia, then it ought to be 
required to say why a warrant is necessary and to provide information that will allow the 
merits of the application to be fully tested. It should also only be authorised when more 
conventional means of investigation have been tried, or when there is a credible case put 
that less invasive options are not feasible (Law Council of Australia 2011, 5). 
Moreover, if a foreign agency requires intrusive police powers, then information about the 
usefulness of the information obtained, how it was used, and whether it helped produce the 
desired outcomes would assist Australian authorities in determining the value of future 
requests (Law Council of Australia 2011, 5). 
This, along with clear and independent reporting requirements and strict and transparent 
privacy safeguards that accompany applications for access to information about 
communications, provide a base-level safeguard.  
The haste with which the cybercrime legislation is being pushed through parliament and 
the preparedness of the government to go beyond what is required for compliance with the 
Convention reveal the political interest informing this initiative. With this in mind, it is 
worth recalling the prophetic insight of the conservative American President Dwight D 
Eisenhower, who advised that ‘In the councils of government, we must guard  
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence … by the military-industrial complex’ 
(cited in Verkuil 2007, 23).  
The Convention fails to provide mechanisms that protect against such influence. This 
creates serious risks for countries, like Australia, that do not have legal constitutional 
safeguards, such as a Bill of Rights. As Rodriguez points out, the Convention fails to specify 
a proper level of privacy protection necessary to limit the surveillance powers it grants law 
enforcement agencies. This creates problems for countries, like Australia, that do not have 
the necessary legal constitutional safeguards. Rodriguez notes that the Convention: 
… has to be read within the context that applies in Council of Europe countries — where there are 
substantial and actionable constitutional protections for human rights. The absence of any such 
countervailing protection for human rights in Australia makes it completely untenable for the 
Convention to be implemented in Australia without very substantial additional provisions that achieve 
a comparable balance. [Rodriguez 2011.] 
 
Criminalising people and activities 
There are a number of serious effects that are entailed by Australia’s embrace of the 
European Convention on Cybercrime. The first is the way in which the new legislation 
creates new crimes, and in doing so inhibits previously acceptable civil actions. 
This is another way in which the proposed legislation goes beyond what is required by the 
Convention. Indeed, older laws with restricted definitions of an offence are replaced by 
broader and more inclusive categories. At the time of writing, the existing legislation 
described criminal offences in terms of interference to ‘a Commonwealth computer’. The 
proposed amendment would enlarge the scope of the offence by referring simply to 
interference with ‘a computer’. By omitting one word (‘Commonwealth’), the new 
legislation has the effect of broadening the category and thereby enveloping many activities 
hitherto deemed to be part of popular and/or legitimate political activities. Under the new 
regime, any kind of unauthorised ‘interference’ with ‘a computer’ is a crime that is 
punishable by two years’ imprisonment.  
Extended surveillance also means that people committing crimes such as downloading 
music, film and literature can now be more readily identified. Personal information 
collected by ISPs can be used to detect copyright infringements and enforce copyright laws. 
While many copyright holders and relevant business interests will be pleased because the 
new laws will make detection of such ‘criminal activity’ simpler, this has significant socio-
legal implications that can see the criminalisation of large groups of people. The legislation 
can, for example, be easily used to identify and track-down ‘pirates’ — namely, those who 
engage in the illegal downloading of material.  
On request, ISPs simply provide subscriber download history to the relevant law 
enforcement agents, making detection and punishment simple. This is a matter of concern 
because it facilitates intrusive practices — especially given that we have websites such as 
‘Pirate Bay’, which boasts some 5 million registered users and which profiles itself as ‘one of 
the world’s largest facilitators of illegal downloading’ and a ‘prominent member of a 
burgeoning international anti-copyright or pro-piracy movement’.1 Will the architects of 
these websites be detected and penalised, and will the site be closed down? Will all users be 
criminalised and punished, or only some?  
The new invasive surveillance laws will have an enormous sweep, raising a myriad of 
questions. What offences will they be directed to detecting and criminalising? Will they be 
directed towards detecting and penalising people who use digital technology to engage in 
e-protest and civil disobedience, or those who download pirated songs, or those involved in 
international espionage? And on what basis will those decisions be made? Will attention be 
directed towards lesser offences, such as teenagers downloading pirated movies? Will those 
who get caught be the less powerful and relatively inexperienced users who are simply 
interested in online civil disobedience or politics, while savvy users avoid detection because 
they have the technical capacity to hide their tracks and avoid detection? What does all this 
mean for less-experienced users?  
The new surveillance practices mean that various forms of hacking — such as slowing 
down or interfering in other ways with the functioning of computer systems, the 
defacement of websites, or accessing information from a restricted access system — will also 
be more easily detected (Australian Institute of Criminology 2005). 
People involved in political activities — such as in DNS Zone transfers, which can involve 
redirecting users from one site to another — can be more easily detected. A recent example 
of this activity involved the activist group LulzSec, which hacked into the News 
Corporation website in the midst of the phone-hacking media scandal. LulzSec redirected 
readers of the Sun Herald newspaper to a different mock site, which carried a fake front-
page news story that Rupert Murdock was dead (‘Media moguls body discovered’). It was 
action that resulted in considerable disruption and the temporary closure of the websites for 
The Sun, The Times, BSkyB and News International. LulzSec also stole information, including 
user names and passwords (Moses and Gardiner 2011). 
Similarly, LulzSec, Anonymous and other activists targeted PayPal and MasterCard with 
‘denial-of-service’ (DoS) attacks in retaliation for those companies suspending payments to 
WikiLeaks after that website disclosed ‘classified documents’ to the public. DoS attacks, 
which typically entail coordinated action to mobilise computer users to target a site at a set 
time, impact on the capacity of the service to function by generating so much traffic that it 
disrupts the normal business. Participants will be more easily detected and policed under 
the new surveillance laws.  
Activism of this kind is not new, and it is in essence no different from older longstanding 
forms of political action and civil disobedience that involved organising groups or crowds 
of people to arrive at a set site and time for a peace demonstration, or simply to have a 
presence, to create attention, or to cause disruption to ‘normal business’ for the purpose of 
making a political point. This can regularly be seen, for example, in some 300 cities around 
the globe as hundreds or sometimes thousands of cyclists (identified only as Critical Mass) 
turn up on a Friday at 5pm in peak-hour traffic at a designated intersection in the city, 
making the case for ‘green road design’, more public transport, or road safety for cyclists. 
 
Accountability and oversight  
Under the new arrangements, there is no provision for an independent oversight agent with 
the power to investigate abuses and there is no public transparency. Agencies that have 
issued preservation notices are subject to a records inspection by the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman. This, however, is limited to inspection of the record, not scrutiny of 
compliance with relevant legislative requirements, or checking whether the information 
accessed was only that which could be lawfully accessed, or that the warrants issues were 
legitimately executed (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2011) . It does not require oversight 
that goes beyond the fact that records are kept.  
The Convention and associated domestic laws omit oversight systems to ensure that these 
much-extended powers are not abused. As mentioned earlier, the Convention exacerbates 
this problem by making it unlawful to notify citizens that they are being subjected to 
surveillance.  
The Australian bill even criminalizes any attempt to disclose the fact that the powers it grants to law 
enforcement have been used to spy on an individual. These gag orders will prevent anyone from 
disclosing the existence and content of interception warrants, all but ensuring innocent individuals will 
never know their civil liberties have been violated. [Rodriguez 2011.] 
As one American commentator observed, while such developments assure ‘unprecedented 
surveillance capabilities’ (Brown B 2011) for this burgeoning private security and 
intelligence business, we are producing an industry that works in secret on activities that 
are funded by the public and that in some cases are used against the very same public, or 
even used by intelligence agencies to survey and ‘data mine’ those identified as the enemy 
— which, in the case of the United States, means the Arab world. ‘Their products’, Brown 
argues: 
… are developed on demand for an intelligence community that is not subject to Congressional 
oversight and which has been repeatedly shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that 
violate US law. And with expanded intelligence capabilities by which to monitor Arab populations in 
ways that would have previously been impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have 
improved means by which to provide information on dissidents to regional dictators viewed by the US 
as strategic allies. [Brown B 2011.] 
Those concerned about security breaches are actually the losers, for there is no clarity about 
measures or standards that will be used to prevent this from happening. We are also talking 
about a very large quantity of rich and highly sensitive material that is ripe for theft. 
The failure of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to continue to exist as an independent 
entity — let alone, as in the European Union and Canada, to act robustly in defence of 
online users against major actors — is worth noting. This is significant, given the legislative 
context. Australia has a very feeble Privacy Act that does not have the power or legal 
wherewithal to protect privacy. Indeed, despite the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 
2008 (Australian Government 2008) report recommending many improvements in privacy 
law, and the government suggesting that it agreed, we have seen not seen an updating and 
strengthening of privacy law. This suggests that a low priority is accorded to privacy 
protection in Australia and points to the policy victory of anti-privacy interests that have 
long undermined privacy principles by repeated incremental breaches and extensions of 
loopholes and exceptions. It is a black hole in human rights regulation and, as such, it is part 
of the problem. 
There is also the question of incompetence or defective operation of these large and 
secretive systems. The record of corruption by law enforcement agencies that have accessed 
official databases for non-work-related matters suggests that there are good reasons for 
concern. The record of government agencies, non-government organisations and private 
companies (such as Centrelink, WorkSafe, phone companies, schools and justice 
departments) that regularly breach the privacy of individuals — often with damaging effect 
— is a worrying trend. This has resulted in complaints to Ombudsmen and data protection 
commissioners that government agencies and private business (such as Google) are already 
breaching privacy. It seems that, in the current situation, these regulatory bodies are not 
able to cope with current breaches of privacy (see, for example, Victorian Ombudsman 2011; 
Information Commissioner’s Office 2011). 
Added to this is the problem of blunders born out of prejudice and the misuse of 
information. For example, the well-known case of Muhamed Haneef in 2007 is a salutary 
reminder of what dossiers of this kind can do to ordinary people. Selected evidence 
constructed in particular ways can make anyone a dangerous person. Remember, too, what 
happened to Victoria’s Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) database and the 
Ombudsman’s call for scrapping the system in the context of ongoing allegations that it was 
being used for criminal activity and misused by police officers. This is particularly 
dangerous because anyone can become suspect and criminalised — even without their 
knowledge. 
 
Effectiveness of the new laws? 
Finally, there is no evidence or research to suggest that the new arrangements will be 
effective in addressing the problem of cybercrime. Indeed, savvy experienced users have 
the technical capacity to hide their tracks and avoid detection. They already enjoy the 
protection of encryption — the use of nodes and off-shore proxies that tunnel and make 
anonymous, and so launder, their digital traffic. Botnets can be implanted in drone 
computers without the user’s knowledge and third-party proxies can be used without 
detection, simply be renting out part of a server outside Australia using a pre-paid credit 
card under a false name.  
The range of actors identified as online threats includes ‘you and your friends’, 
corporations, governments, and third-party criminals. The Convention, however, 
specifically targets third-party criminals while strengthening the capacity for ungoverned 
abuse from corporations and governments (Papacharissi 2010). The Convention does little 
to encourage the kind of individual respect and responsibility needed to address threats 
from ‘you and your friends’, and in this way it fails to target three of the four sources of 
online threats. From the perspective of a pro-consumer or citizen perspective, we may ask 
how these three remaining ‘threats’ have been rendered invisible in the new panopticon 
focused on surveillance of the individual. 
Indeed, what we have seen so far has been an extremely low rate of prosecution — to say 
nothing of conviction — of cybercrimes. Given that the laws are not being used, having 
offences like these on the books does little if anything to reduce the threat. As mentioned 
above, what they do is to criminalise a huge range of activity, allowing for open-ended 
discretion as to whom to prosecute. Having said this, a serious problem does exist with 
regard to the state of IT security. It is a problem that needs to be addressed, but not in this 
way because it does not work. 
All this raises major questions about the point and likely effectiveness of the legislation. 
 
Conclusion  
How do we explain an exercise in which our government seems eager to give away even 
more of our sovereignty and our democracy than the Council of Europe actually wanted? 
This is a serious question that goes to the heart of a democratic culture that can be 
characterised by concerns about ensuring compliance instead of recognising what is 
happening and having the courage to act accordingly.  
The principle of internet neutrality — so crucial to the momentum that enabled the dynamic 
growth of the internet — needs to be nurtured. It should be qualified or abridged only for 
the most serious reasons. (The idea of internet neutrality refers to a network principle 
design that ensures that there is no, or only very limited, discrimination in terms of content 
networks, sites and platforms.) After all, free and healthy democracy needs open 
technology, diversity, creativity and democratic communication, all of which are put at risk 
if we allow the kind of surveillance that the current governments has in mind (Lessig and 
McChesney 2006). Having an open public internet is vital if Australia is ever to sustain a 
vigorous democracy that enables us to avoid being either a lackey or simply obedient. 
Much is at stake, and much more than the functionality of the internet. What is at stake is 
suggested by Veronica Brady in her defence of civilization:  
… seldom before has what we call ‘civilization’ so depended for its survival on the quality of thinking 
and feeling, on steadiness and trust, on the will for community and/or respect for a world in which 
living is not a mere machine for us to drive to its — and our — destruction. For this we need reason and 
creativity, sympathy and compassion. We need people who are deep, wise and humble, ready to share 
themselves and their insights. [Brady 1994, 34.]  
Why this matters was also understood by Michael Kirby, then a High Court judge, when he 
said: 
There are two visions for the future … one defends individual privacy. The other gives up. One asserts 
the capacity of law and policy-makers to uphold a fundamental humanity in the face of technology. The 
other says it is impossible, and possibly unnecessary.  
 Resolving these debates presents one of the greatest questions before humanity in the coming century. 
The resolution will shape the human environment and all that follows … What is at stake is nothing less 
than the human condition. [Kirby 1999.] 
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